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Spirited away: Asylum law and the institutional violence of legal discourse
Abstract
I can’t honestly say I remember, but the chances are it was cold: this was early March in Montreal after all
and it usually is. I wandered south out of the Latin Quarter down through Chinatown and, as the buildings
became gradually either taller or older — one or the other — through the business district. The Federal
Court building was just on the corner there, after the road works and next-door to that ludicrously
overpriced café with the pasta in the window. Through the revolving doors I found a man in a uniform and
a dark blue hat with a badge sitting at a desk in the centre of a large room, only a metal detector for
furniture and his security cameras for company. A few garbled words in French and I was pointed in the
direction of the registrars’ office — juste là bas, through that door on the left. I asked to see a recent
asylum file, any one at all as long as it was in English, and I remember that the lady on the other side of
the counter only ducked away for a moment or two, presumably plucking the first one she could find from
the nearest shelf, before reappearing case in hand. Confronting that first case in the little grey room they
put me in was a thoroughly bemusing experience. For starters the file itself looked like nothing I had ever
seen during the course of my law degrees. A great big blue folder (IMM: 2850-5) with a massive jumble of
papers in it — six hundred pages probably, all told — bound together into various smaller bundles and
arranged in no particular order that I could determine at the time at any rate. This was the law, ‘real’ law; I
felt utterly unprepared for it. And so, naturally enough perhaps, my eye was drawn to the small brown
folder that had been precariously attached to the larger one by a rubber band, but was now sitting there
on the side, almost embarrassingly small by comparison to its big blue brother. Seemed like as good a
place to start as any.
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Spirited away: Asylum law and the
institutional violence of legal discourse
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Finding law
I can’t honestly say I remember, but the chances are it was cold: this
was early March in Montreal after all and it usually is. I wandered
south out of the Latin Quarter down through Chinatown and, as the
buildings became gradually either taller or older — one or the other —
through the business district. The Federal Court building was just on
the corner there, after the road works and next-door to that ludicrously
overpriced café with the pasta in the window. Through the revolving
doors I found a man in a uniform and a dark blue hat with a badge
sitting at a desk in the centre of a large room, only a metal detector for
furniture and his security cameras for company. A few garbled words in
French and I was pointed in the direction of the registrars’ office —
juste là bas, through that door on the left.
I asked to see a recent asylum file, any one at all as long as it was in
English, and I remember that the lady on the other side of the counter
only ducked away for a moment or two, presumably plucking the first
one she could find from the nearest shelf, before reappearing case in
hand. Confronting that first case in the little grey room they put me in
was a thoroughly bemusing experience. For starters the file itself looked
like nothing I had ever seen during the course of my law degrees. A
great big blue folder (IMM: 2850-5) with a massive jumble of papers in
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it — six hundred pages probably, all told — bound together into various
smaller bundles and arranged in no particular order that I could determine
at the time at any rate. This was the law, ‘real’ law; I felt utterly
unprepared for it. And so, naturally enough perhaps, my eye was drawn
to the small brown folder that had been precariously attached to the
larger one by a rubber band, but was now sitting there on the side,
almost embarrassingly small by comparison to its big blue brother.
Seemed like as good a place to start as any.
The brown folder had maybe twenty pages in it, at most, and on
these pages were two identical copies of Justice Simon Noël’s judgment
in the case of Jesurasa v The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration,
an application for judicial review decided only a week or so previously
and, I may as well add now, not a successful one. On page 1, at paragraph
3, it says, ‘The application for judicial review is dismissed.’ Case closed.
The end. At last, I thought, a bit of familiar territory. In law we invariably
start with the punch line.

Facts or function? The violence of process
I actually looked at quite a number of other complete files during my
time at the Federal Court — always asylum cases, always in English —
but for some reason none of them had quite the same impact as this first
one. I experienced it as a kind of shock, and in retrospect perhaps that
is not all that surprising. It seems to me that there was something very
symbolic about the two folders that were plucked for me at random
from the archives at the Federal Court that morning in early March.
From blue folder to brown, Noël J’s words represent the culmination of
a tremendous process of distillation. Desmond Manderson writes the
following of Argentinian master of the short story, Jorge Luis Borges:
Borges is alcoholic. The Arabic al-kuhl first of all referred to a process of
distillation. It is Borges’ relentless purification towards an essence that
produces such a giddy effect upon his readership (Manderson 2006: 98).

Justice Noël is alcoholic too. Six hundred pages of transcriptions,
memorandums, emails, and newspaper clippings: all this and more
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reduced down to 1,106 words; if you include the title.2 And only 212
were deemed necessary to convey the so-called ‘facts’ of the case. I am
going to insert them here now so that you can read them almost as
innocently and a-contextually as I did the first time I opened that little
brown folder. Try to hold on to your initial impressions.
FACTS
The Applicant is a 23 year-old Sri Lankan Tamil. Her mother died in June
1987 and her father in February 1988 during military operation in her village.
In August 1991, her brother was hit by a shell and became handicapped. In
1995, the Applicant and her sister were allegedly harassed by members of
the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The Applicant and her sister
were insulted and threatened by LTTE members for refusing to join the
movement.
The Applicant submits that in 1996, soldiers of the Sri Lankan army
questioned, humiliated, harassed and slapped the Applicant and her brother,
as they were suspected of being members of the LTTE. After her sister left
the family house, the Applicant remained alone with her handicapped
brother.
In February 2002, a ceasefire was signed between the Sri Lankan
Government and the LTTE. In May 2002, the Applicant was asked again to
join the LTTE. She refused and fled to Gurunagar in January 2003. In the
end of April 2003, the LTTE kept urging her to join the movement. At one
point, they allegedly tried to take her by force.
The Applicant’s aunt decided to send the Applicant to Canada. She arrived
on December 17, 2003 and claimed refugee protection at the airport.

That’s it. Together with a swift rundown of the reasoning in the first
instance decision and a few case names dropped in for rhetorical effect,
these ‘facts’ are all that is left of the big blue folder: the essence of the
matter; ethanol; the spirit of the law. In contrast to the full-bodied
richness of the blue folder, with all the subtle nuances of a wine and the
oaky tones of a far broader context, the brown folder is rather more like
the potent sharpness of a vodka, inducing a choking wince and that
giddy rush. We like to oppose the law’s letter to its spirit, but in
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Noël J’s ‘facts’ they are one in the same: the culmination of the law’s
long process of distillation. Over the course of the next two weeks or so
that it took me to read and note the rest of the file, it was precisely the
taste, the subtlety of flavour of this ‘Applicant’s’ story that I began
gradually to develop a sense of.
I have the impression that far too often in law we forget that ‘legal
reasoning’ is not the only site of judgment. Students learn to read case
summaries and headnotes and fact patterns and problem questions as if
that were just the way legal matters entered the world. No doubt they
are dimly aware that some person, possibly even some people, actually
wrote them; no doubt practitioners are even savvier still. But there can
be little doubt that this sort of persistent and systematic disavowal of
authorship, judgment and context in the construction of the so-called
‘facts’ has an impact in the end; do anything for long enough after all
and you are likely to start to believe in it. Peter Goodrich, introducing
his rhetorical analysis of the House of Lords’ reasoning in Bromley
London Borough Council v Greater London Council, writes:
I shall observe briefly that the language of [the] introduction or
characterization of the case is already highly illuminating. As a putatively
impartial description of the facts of the dispute, it is a failure. As an emotive
stylistic characterization of the parties to the dispute and a preliminary
evaluation of their actions, its highly selective use of apparently descriptive
terms is of extreme intradiscursive and semantic relevance, it signals ahead,
or prepares the reader for the outcome which will later be reached (Goodrich
1984: 192-3).

‘Facts’ are not impartial. Right. They are motivated and they are political.
But it is not merely a matter of reading subjectivity back into the
supposedly objective, as Goodrich seems to suggest here.3 Because the
distillation that I was describing above is gradual, it is systematic and it
employs multiple actors and multiple techniques. And the ‘facts’, the
spirit of the law, that we are left with in the end are perhaps nothing but
the function of its mechanics. The politics of legal language, then, are
not just personally but also (if not especially) systemically determined.
Distillation is not a moment, it is a process. How did Noël J come to
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use these words in the first place? With what politics did they already
come? Of what institutional forces, both conscious and unconscious,
are they the function? What is excluded? How? And when? In law, these
are questions which are rarely asked.4 But they are crucial because the
legal process is never innocent: every word nests violence after violence
after violence and each one has real world implications. This is nothing
less than what Jacques Derrida says about all language when he writes:
But there is always something political ‘in the very project of attempting to
fix the contexts of utterances.’ This is inevitable; one cannot do anything,
least of all speak, without determining (in a manner that is not only
theoretical, but practical and performative) a context. Such experience is
always political because it implies, insofar as it involves determination, a
certain non-‘natural’ relationship with others ... Once this generality and
this a priori structure have been recognized, the question can be raised,
not whether a politics is implied (it always is), but which politics is implied
in such a practice of contextualization ... (Derrida 1988: 136 my emphasis).

Here Derrida explicitly goes beyond Goodrich’s claim above because
he universalises it. Language always does this. Every single word is a
political moment, but each one comes to us always already systematically
mediated, structurally violent. Which politics are implied and when?
What do we lose with each iteration, each layer, each contextual
determination? The deconstructive move then is towards an ‘incessant
re-contextualisation’, even on to the entire ‘real-history-of-the-world’
(Derrida 1988: 136): il n y a pas de hors texte. But always in recognition
of the fact that ‘the reconstitution of a context can never be perfect and
irreproachable even though it is a regulative ideal in the ethics of reading,
of interpretation, or of discussion’ (Derrida 1988: 131). Though I would
not wish to suggest that the following reading will be deconstructive,
perhaps it is inspired by the same ethics.
I should add that my contention is not that Noël J’s judgment is, in
any strong sense at least, unjust; I am certainly not claiming that there
is anything ‘illegal’ about it, whatever that problematic word might mean.
In fact, my claim is that, far from irregular, Noël J’s account really does
tell us something about the spirit of the law (in a sense closer to the
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way in which we ordinarily understand that word): it is virtually an
exemplification of the way in which law always works. If it is unusual
at all then it is because it demonstrates the problems of law and language
so dramatically, in so stark a manner. Law and legal interpretation we
know take place in a field of pain and death (Cover 1986: 1601).
Nowhere is this more true than in asylum law. Nowhere could be a
better site for a demonstration of the systematic, institutional, and above
all discursive violence that actually is law.

Asylum (as) law:
from exception to exemplification
We often think of asylum as exceptional. In politics and the media all
over the (English speaking) world we have grown accustomed to a
discourse and a context that speaks of a so-called ‘refugee crisis’5 and
so, in the belief that we are being inundated with ‘illegal immigrants’,
‘queue jumpers’, ‘bogus’ and ‘phoney’ applicants (Pickering 2001: 172),
our governments attempt to batten down the hatches.6 Legislation ticks
over at quite a remarkable pace.7 As does the case load. In 2002, for
instance, ‘in Canada, most Board Members listen to two claimants’
stories each day of the week, for three consecutive weeks, and then
have a week without hearings to write their decisions’ (Rousseau et al
2002: 49). And we set up detention centres in which the rights we would
ordinarily accord to our own citizens are habitually infringed. 8
Conversely, in the critical literature the starting point is often that asylum
seekers are unusually needy legal subjects, especially vulnerable to the
possibility of injustice. Many will have experienced severe
psychological, physical and sexual violence and have endured
horrifically destabilised family and social lives for considerable periods
(Rousseau et al 2002: 48). Far away from their natural support networks,
they are forced to communicate in a language not their own, uniquely
reliant on the goodwill, faithfulness, care, and ability of lawyers,
translators and other officials not only to communicate their stories but
also to help them come to terms with and situate themselves within a
new culture and a foreign land.
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Politically and legally speaking, asylum seekers live on the fringe
then. But it is precisely this fact that makes the texts of asylum law
such exemplary material for analysis. Practical considerations mean that
there is frequently very little, if anything at all, by way of conventional
legal ‘evidence’ — either documentary or testimonial. Resources are
virtually limited to: (a transcription of) the hearing itself, the asylum
seeker’s Personal Information Form (frequently a translation), newspaper
articles, ‘country reports’ and, depending on the circumstances, a small
number of others: for instance psychological evaluation reports. In short,
a handful of stories all competing to be told. Political considerations
put the process under considerable financial and temporal strain too, so
that there are only ever relatively few actors involved in any one case;
files are kept relatively brief. All of which means that it is considerably
easier to observe particular words, ideas or reasoning become
appropriated, tamed or repressed at each step of the way than in other
legal contexts where many of the same moves take place to just the
same extent. In asylum especially it is almost entirely on the field of
language that the law’s battles are fought. It is not that I reject a
perspective that would situate asylum on the fringe, therefore, but rather
that, concerned with textual and linguistic matters as I am, I come at
asylum from a different angle, a different context, looking through a
different lens.
Asylum, rather than an exception to the norm would then be its
exemplification — law distilled, the spirit of law in yet another sense
— and the reading that will shortly follow would have implications far
beyond this one case. Although I have certain practical claims about
this case in particular and certain theoretical claims about violence and
systematicity in law more generally, nevertheless I hope to be able to do
something more. My intentions are explicitly aesthetic. Think back to
your first impressions of the ‘facts’ I quoted above. Read them again if
you like. By beginning at the end and working backwards I want to
enable you actually to feel the violence of language and process, to
taste first the clinical efficiency of law’s project of distillation and then
the justice in a (necessarily partial) opening out to context.
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Reading backwards
I said a moment ago that I do not view the reading that follows as
deconstructive, though I will be employing various terminologies
associated with that practice nevertheless. Perhaps a better word would
be archeological.9 I begin with the uppermost layer, Noël J’s ‘facts’
from the little brown folder, and dig gradually deeper down through the
big blue one, applying a similar logic at each level. I am looking for
rhetorical and formal strategies of persuasion, instances of the semantic
appropriation or neutralisation of words and concepts, and most
especially (and not necessarily unrelatedly) symptoms of the legal system
and process itself: I take a word or a phrase and attempt to show how it
is part of a nested institutional structure.
I will not be referencing every document in the file, however. Nor
could I: this reading is necessarily political too, it is also violent — no
doubt systematically so. And so I will mainly be basing my reading on
the following strata: the ‘Supplementary Respondent’s Memorandum’
submitted on 6 February 2006 just a few weeks before Noël J’s decision,
the text of presiding tribunal member Barbara Berger’s first instance
decision from April 2005, both the transcription and a tape recording
(which was not actually in the blue file itself but which I arranged to
get hold of from Ms Jesurasa’s lawyer) of the crucial hearing itself which
took place on 1 March 2005,10 a Psychological Evaluation Report based
on interviews conducted by Dr Sylvie Laurion over the course of a few
hours’ worth of meetings with Ms Jesurasa in February 2005 and finally
a few pages from Ms Jesurasa’s diaries from around the time she left Sri
Lanka that were, quite revealingly, included in the blue folder but never
officially translated and only ever mentioned once in passing.11
No doubt my reading is as partial as it is parasitic (Hillis Miller
1979), but I would hope that it is both sufficiently sound descriptively,
and sufficiently compelling aesthetically to convey the point I wish to
make. If the ‘truth’ is a moment that perhaps never was, then language
— systematic and violent — is the process by which our imitations of
it are constructed. In law, especially, this process matters.

238

Spirited away

Losing law — finding context
Psychological distancing
FACTS

Written in capitals and underlined, this is going to be a pronouncement.
To an extent, of course, this is ‘merely’ a matter of formal expediency,
but then again one of legal discourse’s great achievements has been
systematically to repress inquiry into its own form (Schlag 1990: 1634).
No matter how well Noël J might know in private, outside his legal
office, that these ‘facts’ are thoroughly contingent and thoroughly
mediated, nevertheless in his role as lawyer and judge the rhetorical
form of his statements must effectively deny all knowledge of these
insights. And what’s more, this is not just some intellectual failing on
his part. Rather, he has been ‘rhetorically constructed this way by the
very legal texts he reads and writes’ (Schlag 1990: 1631). Like this for
instance:
The Applicant is a 23 year-old Sri Lankan Tamil.

‘Applicant’, with a capital ‘A’. Like a name. The barest recognition that
this is a person: a rhetorical distancing, an objectification and an
abstraction that anaesthetises the reader from the violence of the decision
that it prepares us for. As Goodrich puts it, ‘the syntax of impersonality
and distance, producing indirect control in terms of attitude and
generalisation rather than direct command or speech act’ (Goodrich 1984:
188).
Temporal distancing
And apparently this ‘Applicant’ (for there have been many others, of
course — Applicant is a family name) is a ‘23 year-old Sri Lankan
Tamil’. Only ‘The Applicant’ is not 23 at all, ‘The Applicant’ is 24 and
had been for some months in fact. And what’s more, Noël J was explicitly
told as much in the ‘Supplementary Respondent’s Memorandum’ which
he received not three weeks before he rendered this decision.12
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This is not a decision being made in the present tense, then, and
certainly not with an eye to the future. Asylum law, ostensibly for reasons
of practical necessity (time, money and such), has been condemned to
the administrative stream and so this is just an application for judicial
review rather than fully fledged appeal: asylum seekers, we said before,
live on the fringe. The question therefore is not whether this person
ought to be sent home right now, on 24 February 2006, the date of the
judicial review decision, or even at some point in the not-necessarily
near future — it can take months and months for an unsuccessful
applicant eventually to be deported — but only whether the first instance
decision to do so was correct ‘in law’.
And so on the back of this seemingly inconsequential ‘error’ rests a
whole mindset: the difference between 23 and 24 is the difference
between then and now, review and appeal, applicant and appellant. Not
so much an ‘error’, then, as an orientation. From December 2005 to
February 2006 there were reportedly more than six hundred deaths in
the northern and eastern provinces of Sri Lanka alone.13 We can now
say in retrospect that when Noël J wrote this passage Sri Lanka’s descent
into the throes of civil war had very definitely already begun. But that’s
not Noël J’s problem. For him ‘The Applicant’ will always have been a
distant 23.
Sanitising violence: the passive voice
Next Noël J writes:
Her mother died in June 1987 and her father in February 1988 during military
operation in her village.

So finally we learn ‘The Applicant’s’ gender, albeit indirectly. ‘Her’
parents, then, both nameless, ‘died’ — passively — ‘during military
operation in her village’. But there is not, necessarily at least, any
correlation between the two events and nor is there any allusion as to
the nature or duration of the so-called ‘military operation’, in which
words we hear inflected legitimacy, even rationality. This is certainly a
long way from the statement of facts in the Supplementary Respondent’s
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Memorandum where she and her brother were:
Victims of the armed conflict which lasted from 1983 to the ceasefire in
2001 between the army and the LTTE. (My emphasis.)

So ‘victims’ now of prolonged hostilities that would have ‘lasted’ most
of her childhood. Even in Berger’s first instance decision, which is
resoundingly cautious, steeped in restraint, the deaths are attributed to
a hostile cause:
She alleges that her mother was killed in June 1987 and her father in February
1988, during army operations in the area. (My emphasis.)

Though this version certainly smacks of Noël J’s account (the wording
is remarkably similar), Noël J’s is without doubt the sparser of the two.
Despite positing the tentative ‘alleges’, Berger at least conveys the violent
nature of the deaths with the word ‘killed’. And yet, in neither version
do we get a sense of the sustained brutality that is conveyed in Dr Sylvie
Laurion’s Psychological Evaluation Report:
A couple of months before her sixth birthday, her mother was killed in a
shelling attack. Within six months of this event, her father was shot dead.
Ms Jesurasa witnessed both killings.

This, this, is what, by Noël J’s judgment, has been distilled into the
simple passivity — ‘died’.
Neutralising ‘harassment’
The next section of Noël J’s ‘facts’ reads as follow:
In 1995, the Applicant and her sister were allegedly harassed by members
of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The Applicant and her
sister were insulted and threatened by LTTE members for refusing to join
the movement.
The Applicant submits that in 1996, soldiers of the Sri Lankan army
questioned, humiliated, harassed and slapped the Applicant and her
brother, as they were suspected of being members of the LTTE. After her
sister left the family house, the Applicant remained alone with her
handicapped brother. (My emphasis.)
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At first blush Noël J’s words: ‘harassed’, ‘questioned’, ‘humiliated’,
even ‘slapped’ do not sound like particularly heinous offences. Not
very nice, certainly, but we have to draw the line somewhere: the political
climate being as it presently is we cannot let in every stranger that arrives
on our shores and there are surely people out there more worthy of our
hospitality. The word ‘Applicant’ implies a line up, after all: it is by
definition multiple. Perhaps. At least that is what is implied by Noël J’s
language. But dig a little deeper and we find that buried in the word
‘harassment’ is a troubling past.
The word next makes an appearance as follows, in the Supplementary
Respondent’s Memorandum:
Although the Applicant testified that she was harassed in the past by the
two groups, the army and LTTE, nothing ever happened to her. (My
emphasis.)

‘Harassment’, then, is not something that ‘happens’ to you. Or to put it
another way, it is precisely what happens to you when ‘nothing happens’,
because in the conspicuous absence of an explanatory adjective it is
(virtually) empty. Like the word ‘promise’ for instance, to take a
prototypically legal word, it requires something more (What did you
promise? How were you harassed?). On its own here, then, that is exactly
how we read it: as communicating (virtually) nothing, requiring
something more. It is a non-event; almost certainly non-violent and very
probably altogether non-physical, or at the very least non-intrusive. And
presumably non-sexual too. The word ‘sexual’ so commonly precedes
‘harassment’ in English that here we read its very absence. We can infer,
without the need for anyone explicitly to say as much that this is not a
sex issue.
And this kind of barren usage of the word crops up again and again
throughout the file: each time a linguistic deference to a somehow more
authentic and therefore more authoritative past, a deferral that conceals
a crucial difference and constitutes an important decision each time.
Différance, in Derrida’s terminology (Derrida 1985). Once again,
Barbara Berger’s first instance decision is a little more revealing:
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Even if I believed that the soldiers harassed her at times with indecent
propositions, she was never persecuted or even mistreated by them. (My
emphasis.)

In this iteration the redundancy of ‘harassment’ is just as palpable as
before, only more explicitly so. Here, even as the word is finally given
a little positive content in the form of ‘indecent propositions’,
‘persecution’ (the word that crucially must be satisfied in the UN
convention’s refugee definition as incorporated into Canadian law at
section 96 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act 2002) and
even that lowly misdemeanour ‘mistreatment’ are explicitly excluded
from its contents. ‘Harassment’ is so far away from being persecution
here, then, that it doesn’t even constitute mistreatment.
(Mis-) transcription
And so we finally arrive at the hearing itself. And approximately half
way into proceedings, the following exchange appears in the transcript:
Presiding Member to Claimant
Q Okay. No [sic], I am going back to your problems. You told me that
between year 2000 and 2002 ... or 2003 it was, I don’t remember. Let me
check it. (inaudible) About five, six times the army came to your house
when you were alone and they made some propositions to you. They asked
you to go with them. You refused and they left. Did you have any other
problems with the army?
A Likewise, it has happened to some of my friends and they used to take
and ... they ...
Presiding Member to Interpreter
Q I didn’t understand what happened to some of my friends?
Counsel to Presiding Member
— Likewise
A Likewise. Okay.
Claimant
A And it happened to some of my friends and they took them and they had
successfully they arrested them and that’s not happened to me. (My
emphasis.)
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Now as you might have noticed, the word we’ve been tracing here,
‘harassment’, doesn’t appear in this section of text at all. That is precisely
the problem.
I managed, after much to-ing and fro-ing and many a phone call, to
get my hands on the audio-recording of the hearing from Ms Jesurasa’s
lawyer and if you listen to this part of the tape the ‘interpreter’ says,
quite clearly actually, not ‘they had successfully they arrested them’
(whatever that means anyway) as in the transcript, but rather ‘they had
... sexually they harassed them’. (My emphasis.) So as quickly as the
harassment takes on a sexual nature it is lost forever from the written
record by the merest transcription error, a sort of unauthorised
translation, for only the likes of me to dredge up again. Law’s errors
efface themselves. Here we have an example of what Derrida might have
called mal d’archive or, in English, archive fever (Derrida 1996).
Inseparable from, or perhaps even the condition of the archive drive —
the urge to record and to transcribe that we think is so important in law
— is a death or a destruction drive. The very possibility of archiving
simultaneously requires the possibility of error in doing so. As Derrida
puts it: ‘There would indeed be no archive desire without the radical
finitude, without the possibility of a forgetfulness which does not limit
itself to repression’ (Derrida 1996: 19).
And the mal-archiving, the mutation, of ‘sexually they harassed’
into ‘successfully they arrested’, is not ‘merely’ a case of repression.
This is not the sort of (barely subconscious) appropriation of a word
like ‘harassment’ that we have already seen. This is an error, plain and
simple and it invests the transcriber with a tremendous, even potentially
decisive power. In Derrida’s words, ‘entrusted to such archons, these
documents in effect speak the law: they recall the law and call on or
impose the law’ (Derrida 1996: 2). The archive is not simply neutral as
the law might wish us to believe, the expository of some sort of authentic
truth. It has political implications and is very much a tool for change. In
this case, that change may even have been determinative. But there is
more.
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(Mis-) translation
We have been looking at the violence of iterative différance and archive
fever. I turn now to the violence of translation. Eric Prenowitz writes
regarding his translation of Derrida’s Archive Fever: A Freudian
Impression: ‘Whatever it may change, a translation maintains above all
its own fiction, it maintains the true fiction that translation is possible’
(Derrida 1996: 196).
And if this is true theoretically, it is even more palpable in practice.
Listening to the recording of the hearing again with a Tamil friend, the
word that the interpreter translates as ‘sexually harassed’, which we
have just seen erased from the transcript, is (in latin characters rather
than the Tamil script) kedukka. It comes from kedu meaning ‘to destroy’
or ‘to spoil’ (Lifco 2000: 237). So hardly the descriptively empty sort
of ‘harassment’ we see by Noël J’s account then. Especially not when
you read it next to the word that he failed to ‘interpret’ altogether:
katpazhikka. This word comes from the Tamil katpu, meaning ‘conjugal
chastity of wife’ (Lifco 2000: 192), and azhi, meaning ‘to decay, perish
or destroy’ (Lifco 2000: 53). It means rape. Not harassment, not even
sexual harassment, but decisively, horribly, rape. And yet, we would
never know it. Translation effaces its own impossibility, maintains its
own fiction.
The upshot of all this, then, is that the word ‘harassment’, in its
countless iterations right up to the passage we have been reading from
Noël J’s judicial review decision, is always characterised as a minor
problem: less than persecution and even mistreatment. But haunting
each of these iterations is a ghost. What Ms Jesurasa fears is not this
empty ‘harassment’, this ghost tells us, but rape at the hands of the
army or the LTTE, like her less-fortunate friends. Dr Sylvie Laurion
writes in her psychological evaluation report:
Ms Jesurasa names her parents’ deaths as the most traumatic events but
memories and thoughts about the threats to her integrity are more frequent,
intrusive and what she presently fears the most. She is very much afraid of
being harassed or harmed by men in general. Other than family members,
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she would rather avoid men altogether especially those of large stature.
Even during family gatherings, she prefers to play with the children than to
mingle with the adults.

If these men did come round to her house and did ‘harass’, ‘insult’,
‘threaten’ and ‘slap’ her, a young female orphan, what should we imagine
she was thinking? What should we imagine the events that are emptied
into this convenient receptacle of a word ‘harassment’ mean to her?
The Davidson Trauma Scale reveals frequent and disturbing posttraumatic
symptoms such as repetitive intrusive thoughts and nightmares
accompanied by insomnia, flashbacks as well as physical manifestations
of stress such as increased heart rate, trembling and sweating.

What images haunt these nightmares? What does this young woman
see when she lies awake at night thinking of Sri Lanka, trembling and
sweating? Just the occasional irritation of a few overly zealous men
who she wishes would go away so she could get on with her homework?
Or rather something inspired by one of her friends’ first hand accounts
of what it is like to be raped by a man with a gun? By more than one
man with more than one gun? Of course we can never know. But layer
by layer by layer, law’s great project of distillation has systematically
erased the possibility of any of this even being thought. That is the real
point. By the time we get to the judicial review decision all this nuance,
all this complexity, all this flavour, has simply gone and we are left with
the now rather feeble ‘harassment’, potent in its very redundancy and
unmistakably bitter to taste.
Spirited away
I am going to jump now to the end of the passage to locate my concluding
words. They go to a point which I hope might have been implicit
throughout this article but which we have yet to confront directly. Justice
Noël completes his depiction of the ‘facts’ as follows:
The Applicant’s aunt decided to send the Applicant to Canada. She arrived
on December 17, 2003 and claimed refugee protection at the airport.
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The assumption here is that asylum seekers are somehow different from
us. They may have aunts and handicapped brothers and friends and
homes but they do not mind leaving all these things behind because,
whether they have been ‘persecuted’ or not, they are in search of greener
pastures and a better and richer life. The decision is made to leave; just
like that. And then they arrive; just like that. How they made that decision
and how hard it might have been; how they went about arranging the
journey and how long and lonely it might have felt; none of these things
are important, they do not make it into the ‘facts’. Because what we
lose in the distillation process — through all the rhetorical, semantic,
formal and otherwise discursive devices we have seen at work here —
is, most of all, the radically human element, the infinite difference
between ‘The Applicant’ and Maliny. That is her name, Maliny Victoria
Jesurasa. A person. Just like you and me.
The real force of this point was brought home to me for the first
time when I came across the photocopied pages from Maliny’s diary
immersed in the depths of the big blue folder. They are vibrant, playful,
sad and evocative. Their impact is immediate and aesthetic. That they
seem to have been composed over exactly the period that Noël J is
referring to in the passage above, moreover, is especially telling because
the contrast between the stories these two documents tell could not
possibly be greater. Unlike the utterly abstract and lifeless depiction in
Noël J’s account of the ‘facts’, these pages from Maliny’s diary — full
of doodles, stickers, notes from friends in Tamil, names, phone numbers
and addresses — speak unambiguously of a person. They convey
something of the terrible reality which leaving behind your friends,
family and home must unquestionably entail. A reality which, through
all this law and process, it is so very easy to forget; or, more to the
point, to be made to forget. On one particularly affective page, for
instance, under what I am told is a farewell message from one of Maliny’s
friends, there are two hearts, drawn close enough together so that their
tips intersect like a Venn diagram. In one is written the letter M —
presumably for Maliny — and in the other the letter T; two friends
bound together no matter that one would soon be on the other side of
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the world. On another page somebody has drawn a flamingo over which
has been placed a sticker containing the only word in the whole diary to
appear in English. It says ‘congratulations’. For what, one can really
only guess, but the awful reality of the paradox is striking: a diary which
speaks a real sadness throughout — friends lost, a home abandoned —
yet which holds out a faint hope, a promise, of a brighter, safer, future.
Congratulations: perhaps for managing to escape.
Now my descriptions here really do not do these pages justice. That
is a shame in a way, but it is also precisely the point. Unlike everything
else in the file, Maliny’s diary has been left untouched by the legal
process. And that is exactly the reason it is so incredibly affective.
Palpably human, it is irreducible to words; and thus to law, to legal
discourse. Undistilled, it is all the more potent; it seems to symbolise
that which the legal process is perhaps most especially incapable of
capturing, that most ineffably human of qualities we sometimes like to
call spirit.

Notes
1

My sincerest thanks to Desmond Manderson whose inspiration,
encouragement and generous feedback made this article possible. Special
thanks also to Karen Crawley for all her comments and support, even at
short notice. And finally, to the Canada Research Chair for Law and
Discourse for funding my trip to Melbourne back in June 2006 so that I
could present the paper which eventually grew into this article at the Law
and Literature Association of Australia’s annual conference, much
appreciation.

2

On reading this, one recent commentator pointed out that that seemed like
awfully few words to be made to span over 10 pages and wondered if
perhaps I had made some mistake. In fact, my figures are correct. Although
the whole decision could easily have been made to fit onto one page, it was
spread as thinly as possible — large margins, double spacing etc —
presumably to give the impression of substantiality. Indeed, the two copies
of Judicial Review Decision appear on thicker, obviously more expensive
paper than any of the other documents. And on the top of the front page in
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both cases there is an embossed gold coat of arms. No matter the quality of
the decision itself, the reader is left in no doubt that these documents are
sufficient in the eyes of the law. They reek of authority.
3

I should add that I don’t doubt that Goodrich would agree with me here.
My claim is merely that he is not making any claims about the systemic
nature of the politics of language in this particular quotation.

4

And even though much good work has undoubtedly been done in the
context of the ‘law and literature’ movement, there seems to me to have
been a tendency to avoid confronting directly the systematicity which I
want to emphasise here.

5

The Guardian reports on the 2006 anniversary of Guy Fawkes’s failed attack
on Parliament, 5 November, ‘for the first time in British history, there are
asylum seekers who could attack the country which gave them sanctuary’.
How it knows this, I’ve no idea. Unsurprisingly perhaps, no source is given.
Apparently, it is a good one though, as the report continues, ‘Everyone
now condemns past governments for allowing London to become
‘Londonistan’, a centre for Islamist exiles’: http://www.guardian.co.uk/
commentisfree/story/0,,1939959,00.html

6

And in Canada, at least, it seems to be working. ‘Over the past 15 years,
Canada has received approximately 28,000 inland claims per year. In 2001
the IRB received 45,000 claims; in 2002, 39,000; in 2003, 29,000; in 2004,
26,000 (numbers rounded to nearest thousand). With the tightening of US
security provisions since 11 September 2001, and the Safe Third Country
Agreement, which came into effect in December 2004, the number of refugee
claims has fallen steadily. It is expected that fewer than 20,000 claims will
be made during 2005’ (Showler 2006: 220).

7

In the UK, for instance, there was a major new piece of legislation purporting
to overhaul, significantly amend or both, the British asylum every three
years from 1993 to 2002 (Cohen 2003: 23). Only slightly behind schedule,
in March 2006, the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006 received
Royal Assent.

8

Amnesty International online quotes refugee, Ibrahim Ishreti, on the subject
of detention centres in Australia, as saying, ‘We came to a country we
heard has human rights and freedom. We can’t believe what’s happening
to us ... We haven’t any human rights. We are just like animals. We do not
have a normal life like a human. Our feeling is dead. Out thinking is dead.
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We are very sad about everything. We can’t smile’: http://www.amnesty.ca/
resource_centre/news/view.php?load=arcview&article=2567&c
=Resource+Centre+News
9

And again, I do not intend this in the strict Foucaultian sense (Foucault
1969).

10 Interestingly enough, however, the transcription is dated 5 December 2005.
Whether the tapes would have been transcribed if Ms Jesurasa had not
appealed the first instance decision I do not know.
11 By Barbara Berger at the very beginning of the hearing as follows:
Presiding Member to Claimant
Q Was that your diary or what was ... what did you have with you, they
photocopied [sic]? It’s ... it’s not in English
A Diary
— It was your diary. That’s what I thought. Okay.
12 He could also quite easily have deduced it for himself from the countless
times Ms Jesurasa’s date of birth is written on her Personal Information
Form.
13 http://english.people.com.cn/200606/05/eng20060605_271066.html 5 June
2006.
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